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THE NATIONAL POINT OF VIEW IN ECONOMICS

ANNUAL ADDRESS OF THE PRESIDENT

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A convenient text is found in one of the most profound but least appreciated passages in *The Wealth of Nations*. Apropos of systems of land tenure the passage reads: "When land, like movables, is considered as the means only of subsistence and enjoyment, the natural law of succession divides it, like them, among all the children of the family; of all of whom the subsistence and enjoyment may be supposed to be equally dear to the father. . . . But when land was considered as the means, not of subsistence merely, but of power and protection, it was thought better that it should descend undivided to one."¹

Here was a clear recognition of one of the most important principles of national policy. When a nation is thinking primarily of its own growth, prosperity, and power, of its ability to meet the conditions of life as a nation, its institutions and its policies may be very different from what they would be if it were thinking primarily of the consumers' satisfactions or of the enjoyment which it might afford to its individual citizens. It may be added that when its individual citizens themselves are thinking primarily of the prosperity, power, and greatness of the nation they will frame institutions and carry out policies very different from those which they will frame and carry out if they are thinking primarily of their own satisfaction as consumers, or of their own subsistence or enjoyment. Moreover, if economists, however completely they may be divorced from sentiment, are thinking in terms primarily of national prosperity, power, and greatness, their conclusions on many important questions will be very different from what they would be if they were thinking primarily of consumers' satisfactions, of subsistence, or of enjoyment. The economics of consumers' happiness is one thing; the economics of national power and greatness is another thing.

Adam Smith's remarks on primogeniture may or may not be a case in point. We may or may not agree that primogeniture does work better in the process of nation-building and expansion than equal subdivision. As was remarked long ago, it was at least a

¹ Book III, Chap. II.

guarantee that there would be only one drone in the same family. It at least made it necessary that the younger sons go out into the world and shift for themselves. They were not encouraged to hang around home waiting for the old folk to die in order that they might get a share of the estate. They had to go where there was land and build estates of their own, if they wanted them. This may have had something to do with the expansion of the English race and of the British Empire. On the other hand, in those old countries where the Code Napoléon had been in force there has been little expansion. Relatively speaking, there has been a decline in power both economic and military.

And yet, to anyone who thinks mainly in terms of consumers' satisfactions, of fair play and equal rights in matters of enjoyment, primogeniture seems a monstrous iniquity, and the equal subdivision of land among all heirs is the only system which is even tolerable. Of course there may be those who realize that it is better for the individual to belong to a prosperous, powerful, and expanding nation than to an unprosperous, weak, and contracting nation. This consideration might lead them to surrender many consumers' satisfactions in the immediate present in the interest of nation-building, hoping that they, their children or their childrens' children may gain enough consumers' satisfactions in the future to compensate for the sacrifices of the present. This would bring them very close to those who think primarily in terms of nation-building, if it did not identify them absolutely. They might, even though they themselves were younger sons, favor primogeniture if they were convinced that it promoted the prosperity, power, and expansion of the nation, hoping that their children and their childrens' children would gain enough through citizenship in such a country to compensate for the loss to themselves.

This, however, is not intended as a defense of primogeniture. I use this illustration partly because it was dignified by the great Adam Smith, and partly because it is, in itself, a good illustration of the principle which I am trying to make clear. Another illustration, less realistic and less disputable, may be manufactured for the occasion. If, instead of the father's landed estate, we were to consider the father's sword as the object which passes by inheritance, the point may be made clear. If, with the inheritance of the father's sword, there was also inherited the obligation to use it for the defense or the building of the nation, it could scarcely

be considered as depriving the other sons of their rights if the sword went intact to one, instead of being divided up. That would be so obviously sensible that no one would be likely to champion the rights of the disinherited sons. But if, instead of a weapon or a tool to be used in nation-building, the sword were thought of as an object of pleasure, a consumer's good, the case would be different. They who think in terms of consumers' satisfactions are uniformly rather strenuous in their insistence upon their full share. The same rule which seems so obviously sensible from the other point of view becomes obviously and wickedly unfair and stupid from the new point of view. The whole difference is in the point of view.

There is another illustration equally clear and to the point, and also dignified by an eminent and highly respected authority. It is found in the story of a certain ruler who entrusted sundry pieces of money to his servants, to one five, to another two, and to another one. He who had received one piece of money did not use it but hid it away. When the ruler returned he ordered that this one piece of money be taken away from the man who had not used it, and that it be given to the one who had used his five so productively as to gain another five. Now, I venture to say that no one who thinks of pieces of money as sources of subsistence or enjoyment ever understood this story or ever will so long as the world stands. But one who thinks of pieces of money as tools to be used in nation-building, finds the story so obviously sensible as almost to preclude the possibility of discussion. Such a person can see no reason for inventing the absurd theory that pieces of money did not mean what they obviously did mean, but spiritual qualities instead. He would know that it is a waste of good tools to have them hidden away, and that in the interest of society or of the nation they ought to be taken away from the one who thus wastes them and given to the one who shows his capacity to use them productively. However, to one who thinks only or primarily in terms of consumers' satisfactions, and to whom pieces of money are merely sources of consumers' satisfaction, it would seem monstrously unjust to take away from the poor man the one source of satisfaction which he possessed and give it over to the rich man who had ten already. The same rule, again, looks very different from the two points of view. It is the point of view that makes the difference.

If one were permitted to step outside the field of economics in the narrower sense, and make an observation or two in the field

of economics in the broader sense, now temporarily cultivated by the moralist, one might remark that the concentration of attention upon subsistence and enjoyment rather than upon nation-building, leads to an exaggerated insistence upon the rights of the individual, whereas the concentration of attention upon nation-building leads to a strong emphasis upon the obligations of the individual. Therefore, there are two distinct types of leadership. One type tells the people a great deal about their rights, their wrongs, and their grievances, and very little about their obligations, except their obligations to themselves. The other type tells them very little about their rights, their wrongs, and their grievances, but a great deal about their obligations. The first type is a logical product of the habit of mind which lays emphasis upon the subsistence and enjoyment of the individual; the other of the habit of mind which lays emphasis upon the importance of building a strong, durable, and expanding nation.

The fact that a change in the point of view makes such a vast difference in the way the same thing looks to us will also explain the change which frequently comes over a man when he has, through popular leadership, come into a position of power and responsibility. It has often been noticed that a man who has achieved leadership through demagogic appeals to the masses becomes a different man when put into high public position. If he does not, he does not last long, being repudiated even by the followers who put him in. As a champion of those who think in terms of their own subsistence and enjoyment, he was one kind of man and things really looked to him in a certain way. In high national office he is compelled to think in terms of the nation as a whole. If he does not, he is such an obvious misfit that even the sense of humor of the masses can not tolerate him. If he does, many things which formerly looked black now look white and many which looked white now look black. It is very easy for the conservative, on the one hand, to say that responsibility has sobered him. He has not necessarily grown more sober; frequently he is less so. He is usually even more of a visionary, the difference being that he has got a larger vision. It is equally easy, on the other hand, for those who have not yet achieved high office to say that he has sold out to the interests. Generally he is less under the domination of interests than he was before. The simple fact is that he is forced to see things from a national point of view rather than from a particularistic point of view; and the sheer

logic of the situation forces different views and a different attitude upon him.

The change in the point of view produces some of its widest divergences of opinion on the question of government regulation and control. When we think primarily in terms of our own satisfactions we are rather intolerant of government regulation when it affects us directly. We may be very tolerant of, or favorable toward, government regulation of other people; but as for ourselves, we want none of it. We are all consumers, therefore regulation of consumption is abhorrent. The regulation or control of some particular line of business is a different matter, especially if it is not our business. Yet habits of consumption are quite as important to the welfare of the nation, considered as a nation, as methods of business. It is generally believed that nations have deteriorated quite as frequently and quite as rapidly because of their bad habits of consumption as because of the bad methods of any or of all classes of business men. When one takes the national point of view, that is a consideration of the very greatest importance. Those academic distinctions between regulation of consumption and regulation of production seem trivial in comparison. As a matter of observed fact, the people who think in terms of nationality are just as prone to legislate on matters of consumption as on matters of business. The government regulation, or prohibition, of the consumption of alcohol, is quite the most popular and democratic movement in this country today, particularly among those who have been here long enough to develop a sense of nationality. Again, as a matter of observed fact, whenever a nation is, in the vernacular, "up against the real thing," when its very existence as a nation is at stake, and when it is forced to think in terms of nationality, it always finds it just as necessary that its government should regulate consumption as that it should regulate production.

Another and even more striking example of this divergence of opinion is found in our attitude toward control or regulation of speech. I make my living by talking, as do a fair percentage of the active members of this Association. We are therefore unable, most of us, to see any reason why the government should regulate our business. We are pretty strong for freedom of speech and freedom of the press and all other euphemisms for a *laissez-faire* policy with respect to the business of talking. It also happens, curiously enough, that they whose business is talking are the strongest advocates of the abandonment of the *laissez-faire* policy

—with respect to business—that is, other kinds of business. For much the same reason, they whose business consists in doing rather than in talking are too frequently impatient of loose talk and disposed toward its control. It would be a profitable exercise for all of us to ponder a little more upon the ancient remark about those who were more anxious to pluck motes from their brothers' eyes than beams from their own. That would do us more good than to spend our time inventing absurd reasons why the government should regulate other people's business and pursue a *laissez-faire* policy with respect to our own.

There can scarcely be any doubt that bad talk may do quite as much harm to the nation as bad business. As many and as direful calamities have come upon the world through bad talk, false teaching, pernicious opinions, as through bad business methods. He who teaches falsehood probably harms the people more than he who steals a million dollars, though it will appear otherwise to those who think that truth is unimportant and money all important. The only question is, Can we trust government officials with the delicate task of deciding what is good and what is bad talk, and of suppressing the bad? Well, any government official who thinks that he is wise enough to regulate industry is not likely to be withheld by his own modesty from undertaking the regulation of speech. Again, as a matter of observed fact, no government official does hesitate to exercise censorship so far as his authority extends. Over the members of his own staff, which is as far as his power extends, he does exercise control of speech. Even the least free and most narrowly sectarian college in this country allows more freedom to its staff than the most liberal department of this freest of all governments. The head of a department who is at all ingenuous will frankly acknowledge this, and justify it by the perfectly sound reason that any department which is charged with important regulatory powers must control the utterances of its staff. I mention these things neither to justify nor to condemn, but merely to show that one kind of regulation is very likely to lead to another.

Again, as a matter of observed fact, whenever any nation "comes up against the real thing," when circumstances compel it to think in terms of its own existence as a nation, it finds it necessary, through its government, to control both speech and industry—the one quite as rigorously as the other. Again, if you will name the country which in time of peace most thoroughly

regulates business and industry, you will name also the country which most rigorously regulates speech.

These may be mere coincidences, but they are so numerous as to create a presumption that the nation that definitely abandons a *laissez-faire* policy with respect to one branch of human activity is not likely to preserve it with respect to all others. Talkers may, of course, easily invent reasons for placing the business of talking in a different category from other businesses. I could state a dozen such reasons myself, and an equal number to the contrary. But the practical statesman and man of affairs, whatever he may have said in a political campaign, is singularly indifferent to these theoretical distinctions when he faces a real situation.

Please do not understand this as an argument for a *laissez-faire* policy with respect to production, consumption, or speech. It is as much against as for such a policy. The important point is that whatever policy is pursued with respect to one is likely also to be pursued with respect to the others. We are already beginning to hear about the changed attitude of governments toward industry brought about by the war in Europe. Some are speculating as to the results of this changed attitude after the war is over. Let us not close our eyes to the fact that the change in the attitude of those governments toward consumption, toward speech, and toward everything else which affects the national well-being is quite as great and quite as striking as the change in their attitude toward industry. They have found that vicious habits of consumption and hostile expressions of opinion are quite as dangerous to the well-being of the nation as bad business methods. When we begin to think in terms of nationality we shall all discover the same thing.

The statement that one function of government is to protect the weak against the strong is another product of the particularist point of view. Since most of us are weak rather than strong, we doubtless feel that we should get more individual advantage from a government which followed that rule than from one which did not. Even those who occupy a middle position between the weak and the strong feel that they have more to fear from the strong than from the weak; therefore they would be inclined, if they sought their own advantage, to cast in their lot with the weak. But if we are thinking not primarily how much profit we of this generation can get from the government, but how the nation may grow strong and endure, it would seem rather absurd, would it not, to protect the weak against the strong? To protect

weakness against strength is to favor weakness and bid it multiply and replenish the nation. That is one way of building a weak nation. It would obviously be better to protect strength against weakness. As a matter of fact, that comes more nearly being the policy of any country worth living in than the opposite. Criminals are weak rather than strong. Somewhere between thirty and fifty per cent of them are feeble minded. It is found economical to protect strength against that kind of weakness at least.

However, the aim of the nation-builder should be neither to protect weakness against strength, nor primarily to protect strength against weakness. The obvious thing to do is to protect production against predation, usefulness against harmfulness, virtue against vice. Whether the predacious act is performed by a strong or a weak individual does not matter. It must be repressed in either case. Whether the productive act be performed by a weak or a strong individual does not matter; it must be protected in either case. Only thus can the nation grow strong, prosperous, and fit to survive in the stern rivalry, economic or military, among national groups.

One of the widest of these divergences of economic opinion, depending upon the point of approach, is found in the answers to the question as to how wealth ought to be distributed. From the point of view of those who are interested primarily in consumers' satisfactions, especially in the satisfactions of those consumers who are now living and possessed of voices with which to clamor for their share, there is much to be said in favor of some approach to equality of possessions. The weak producers probably have on the average as much capacity for consumers' enjoyment as the strong producers. Certainly no very satisfactory argument to the contrary has yet been presented. If the maximum of consumers' satisfaction is the object to be sought, the weight of the argument is in favor of some approach to equality. It is demonstrated that among people with equal capacity for enjoyment equality of consumption yields the maximum satisfaction. It is true that some concession would have to be made in favor of the strong producer provided it were found that he would not put forth his maximum effort unless he received special rewards. Unless the strong producers did put forth their best efforts at production, there would be fewer consumers' goods and consequently less consumers' satisfactions. It would therefore be necessary to allow the strong producers just enough in the way of special rewards

to induce them to use their powers. Aside from such considerations, the weight of the argument is in favor of some form of communism.

From the point of view, however, of those who are primarily interested in nation-building, the weight of the argument is in favor of distributing wealth in proportion to productive power, regardless of ability to consume joyfully. In the first place, they who have shown the ability to accumulate capital by consuming less than their income are to be considered better guardians of that accumulation than they who have not shown such capacity or willingness. If it were turned over to those who have been in the habit of consuming all they had, there would be a strong probability that they would consume it and not conserve it. In the long run, it is pretty certain that the nation which accumulates capital most rapidly is the nation which grows most rapidly in property and power. It is a rather noticeable fact that even laborers tend to leave those countries where capital does not accumulate and seek those countries where it does accumulate. So likewise do scholars, writers, and talkers.

Again, to invest capital is to direct the productive power of the community. They who direct that productive power wisely, that is, they who invest in such a way as to make it yield a large product, are economizing the productive power of the community. On the other hand, they who misdirect that power, who invest unwisely, who direct productive power in channels where it is not needed—in such a way as to produce less than is used up in the process—are wasting the productive power of the community. It is much better for the nation that the accumulations of capital be invested by those who can do it wisely and productively than that these accumulations should be invested by wasters, that is, by those who invest them where capital is not needed or in ways which use up more than is produced. In the long run, it is safe to say that the country which manages to put its accumulated capital under the control of the wisest investors is the country which will grow most rapidly in prosperity and power. To such a country even laborers will desire to migrate, and so also will scholars, writers, and talkers. In other words, it is better for all of us, in the long run, that accumulated capital should be distributed in proportion to investing ability than that it should be distributed in proportion to the power of graceful, elegant, or even jovial consumption. "To each according to his ability to

use productively, to manage, or to invest," should be the slogan rather than "to each according to his needs."

If I have succeeded in making it clear that it makes a difference with our conclusions on many questions of economic theory and policy whether we start from the national or from the particularist point of view, my next purpose is to plead for the national point of view. This point of view is especially needed at the present time because so many weighty opinions are being expressed against it. Tolstoi pronounced patriotism to be a vice. One of the leading moralists of the country has said that nationalism is one of his pet abominations, having in mind the situation in Europe at the present time. It is doubtless wrong for a people to make war under the stimulus of national arrogance; but his philosophy would make it equally wrong for a nation to fight to defend its territory or even its existence against the attacks of national arrogance. It may be said, in behalf of his consistency, that the moralist just quoted accepts the latter proposition along with the former. National existence is not worth fighting for under his theory. From that point of view, Horace Greely's advice regarding the secession movement was profoundly wise, "Let the erring sisters depart in peace." There were many in those days to whom national unity did not seem worth fighting for, and who opposed the war on that ground. From the particularist point of view it would be a little difficult to state what class in the North had a definite economic interest in the question, or how the non-slave owning majority in the South had anything at stake. Neither the laboring classes nor the business and professional classes were in visible danger of having their incomes reduced. All classes then living could, so far as any one has ever been able to show, have consumed as much had the country split up as if it remained united. The only class that might have suffered economically was the government officials. They would have ruled over a smaller country, and the salaries might conceivably have been smaller, though even this is by no means certain. To be sure, there were certain large but vague questions regarding the distant future which may have weighed heavily on the minds of men. Had the country split then, it was difficult to see where the particularist tendency would end. The possibility that at some distant day their descendants would suffer from the weakness of a divided country may have had its influence; but such considerations do not have much weight except with those who have what

is called a national consciousness. There was barely enough of this to save the day against the indifference of the particularists of the North and the opposition of the secessionists of the South. The little flame of national sentiment had to be nursed and coaxed by the persuasive force and magnetic personality of the greatest of all popular leaders.

A distinguished sentimentalist, who can scarcely be dignified by the name of moralist, has recently said before a large body of laboring men in New York that even in case of a military invasion of this country the laboring men would have no interest at stake and no motive for supporting a defensive war. Quoting the *Communist Manifesto*, she exclaimed that the laboring men had "nothing to lose but their chains." Anyone who believes that believes that laboring men are swine, that they have no interest beyond a full belly and a short working day,—that they have no souls. I refuse to believe it.

If one begins the inquiry as to how incomes and dinner-pails would be affected by foreign domination, why stop with the laboring men? They certainly have as much to lose as any other class. Suppose that we were to submit quietly to foreign occupancy, and the taking over of the government at Washington by a foreign power, who among us would suffer any diminution of income or of consumers' satisfactions? It is unlikely that our business men would suffer as a class. In fact, there is no foreign government which is strong enough to attempt a conquest which does not treat business men quite as well as our government, which does not protect life and property and repress mob violence rather more effectively than our government is in the habit of doing.

Again, so far as the economic self-interest of those now before me is concerned, it is difficult to see how you as a class would be economically injured if another government sent an army and took possession of our capital and ran its machinery. In any country which is strong enough to attempt such a thing, scholarship stands higher, and scholars are better treated, than in this country. If you have no interest beyond your own incomes and consumers' satisfactions, why should any of you bestir yourselves to repel an invasion? And yet, with this argument fully in mind, I venture to say that at least ninety-nine out of a hundred, even of your class, would bestir themselves and make considerable sacrifices to prevent such a thing from happening. The hundredth, if there be one, would be about as popular as a copperhead was in the North

at the end of the Civil War. The ninety and nine would be tempted to classify him as a white-livered scoundrel. While the idea might be correct, the nomenclature would not be strictly scientific. It would be better to call him the kind of philosopher to whom nationality is a pet abomination.

There is, however, one small class who alone would lose heavily by a foreign conquest. This class is made up of sundry gentlemen in Washington and various other capitals now holding jobs and receiving salaries which, though not large, are as a rule larger than those same gentlemen could earn elsewhere. They would most certainly be turned adrift and their places filled by representatives of the conquering power. If nobody cared except they who had something to lose in the way of income, these gentlemen would naturally be most vitally interested. They who think and talk only in terms of full dinner-pails and easy hours would doubtless say that these gentlemen were merely afraid of losing their jobs.

But should the rest of us care? We should. We do not look cynically upon those gentlemen merely as the holders of easy jobs and the receivers of fat salaries, though their jobs and their incomes do undoubtedly mean as much to them as ours do to us. We look upon them rather as trustees of our national interests and the agents for the carrying out of our national aspirations.

The sentiment of nationality is as real as hunger, thirst, or family affection, and like them it supplies us with a motive which impels us to a proper functioning. Indeed, there is a pretty close parallelism between family sentiment and national sentiment as a motive for functioning. To one who possesses neither it would appear rather stupid to deprive one's self of consumers' satisfactions merely to provide means for the support of a family. A man whose interests do not extend beyond a full belly and a short working day would see no reason why he should sacrifice these interests merely in order that his species might survive. The number of men who desert their families and the larger number who have no families at all, are proof that there are considerable numbers who reason that way. There may be some moral philosophers among them to whom family sentiment is a pet abomination. Why should not a sentimentalist of the same shallow type as the one referred to above advise all such men not to sacrifice anything for such an absurd sentiment as family affection, telling them that they have "nothing to lose but their chains."

However, it would probably not be very difficult to convince the average audience that family affection really has a place in the economy of nature. It seems to supply a motive which leads men to do what would, without it, be contrary to their individual or particular interests, in favor of the interest of the species. The future members of our race have a vital interest in what we do, but they have no voice to persuade us, or bribe to offer us. They have, nevertheless, an advocate with us, to appeal powerfully to our wills to persuade us to do what is necessary for their salvation. That persuasive advocate is domesticity.

It seems to have been pretty well demonstrated that the human race succeeds better when it hunts in packs or works in groups than when it hunts or works as individuals. In the long run, the well-being of the species seems to depend about as definitely upon the existence of some large group, variously called state or nation, as upon the small group called the family. Without a sentiment of nationality it would be about as difficult to preserve the larger group as it would be to preserve the smaller group without a sentiment of domesticity. They who lack national sentiment find it as difficult to frame arguments in favor of sacrificing individual for national interests as they who lack family sentiment find it to frame arguments in favor of sacrificing individual for family interests. In neither case do men find themselves wise enough or virtuous enough to safeguard the future interests of mankind. Lacking these sentiments, they build only as well as they know; possessing them, they build better than they know.

Even though we possess the family sentiment, few of us are wise enough to plan as wisely for our descendants three generations in the future as we do for ourselves. None of us is wise enough to plan for those who are to live a hundred, or even ten, generations hence. The feebleness and shortsightedness of the intellect is here supplemented by the generous sentiment of nationality. It is through this sentiment that we are led, "as by an invisible hand," to safeguard the interests of that vast majority which never votes for the excellent reason that it is not born yet. Without this sentiment we should each of us join in the query, What has posterity ever done for me that I should do anything for posterity? Self-interest, even when widened so as to include one's own immediate flesh and blood, will not lead us to safeguard the interests of that vast unborn majority. The sentiment of nationality, the love of country, pride in its growth and prosperity, the desire

to see it grow and hold an honorable place among the nations of the earth, these are the salvation of those voiceless generations whose prosperity and happiness for centuries to come depend upon what we do here and now.

It must be admitted, however, that there are perversions of the national sentiment as there are perversions of hunger, thirst, and sex. But it ought not to be difficult to distinguish between the perversion of an instinct and the instinct itself. "Does not war proceed from national sentiment?" is sometimes asked by the men and women who have forgotten, if they ever knew, that wars were more frequent and more continuous before such a thing as nationality or national sentiment existed than they are now. It is probably true, however, that when it does come, a war between highly organized and powerful nations is more terrific than one between weak and disorganized hordes with little national consciousness. If a powerful national sentiment is a factor in building a powerful and prosperous nation, and such a nation is therefore capable of carrying on a terrific war, there may then be said to be a connection between a strong national sentiment and the terrific character of a modern war. But shall we surrender the power and prosperity which come from a compact and well organized national life, and grow weak and unprosperous, merely in order that we may not be able to wage war on such a scale and with such destructiveness as that which the world is now witnessing? Before a war can be carried on on a vast scale there must be vast power and resources, both in men and the products of the mind. Before it can be very destructive there must be something to destroy as well as something to be used in destruction. To propose to divest humanity of all national sentiment in order to save it from the havoc of war is about as reasonable as to divest it of appetite in order to save it from the perversions of appetite.

"Where there is no vision, the people perish." This is said to be a bad translation. "Where there is no vision the people become disorganized, or throw off restraint," is said to be more accurate, but it may mean much the same thing. If they become disorganized, if they throw off restraint, if they will not subject themselves to discipline, they will grow weak. In the eternal process of trial and rejection, of survival and extinction, by which every step in progress thus far in this unfinished world has come about, weakness means death. This applies not to plant and animal forms alone, but to social institutions, moral systems,

forms of government, tribes and nations of men as well. Can democracy discipline itself and fit itself to meet this test? If not, democracy can no more survive than could any of the other thousand and one organisms that have become extinct through their inability to meet the conditions. The world has always been ruled by the disciplined nations, and unless there is a complete reversal of the process, it will be ruled by them to the end of time. If democrats can discipline themselves as well as rulers can discipline their subjects, then democracy may survive; otherwise not.

There is no motive known to any student which will compel a whole democracy to discipline itself, except a powerful national sentiment. The individuals must all, with one accord, care and care intensely for the same thing. This and this alone will enable each person to subject his interests to the good of the whole, and the lesser interest of the present to the larger interest of the future. Only they to whom Webster's words on Union and Liberty meant something for which they cared considerably were prepared to hazard their lives for that something. Only they who, like Milton, see in their minds "a great and puissant nation," have the vision which keeps men from becoming demoralized, from throwing off restraint, from becoming undisciplined. Without this endurance of restraint—without this self-discipline—the people perish.